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I.  Introduction: Another Crisis? 
 
1.  Exactly five years have passed since the Asian financial crisis hit the Thai 
foreign exchange market in July 1997.  The crisis-stricken East Asian countries 
have shown significant and remarkable recovery progress with a varying degree, 
thanks to far-reaching structural reforms.  ADB recently predicted that the East 
Asian nations would grow faster than expected this year and on. (ADB, July 
2002)  For example, Korea would grow 6.1 percent this year and 6.0 percent in 
2003.  The Korean Government carried out its promises to the IMF, including the 
reform of the financial sector and chaebol, the closing of non-viable merchant 
banks, bank recapitalization, the expansion of foreign exchange fluctuations, and 
the accommodation of global standards. 
 
2.  One of the most important lessons that we learned from the 1997 Asian crisis 
is that strong macroeconomic fundamentals are not enough to prevent currency 
crises.  Up until the time of the ERM crises of 1992-1993 and the Mexican crisis 
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of 1994-1995, explanations and models of currency crises stressed the role of 
macroeconomic fundamentals—the ‘first-generation’ models.  The Asian crises 
have shifted the focus of attention from the role of macroeconomic fundamentals 
in currency crises to that of financial sector weaknesses and the increase in an 
economy’s vulnerability to an external speculative attack which could be triggered 
by a sudden and unexpected shift in market expectations—the ‘second-
generation’ models. 
 
3.  Due to the increased globalization of financial markets, a change in 
expectations or investor sentiment can induce a sudden, sharp reversal in capital 
flows, precipitating a currency crisis.  A crisis can take place more rapidly, 
unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals, than in the past.  Crises tend to 
become more severe and even less predictable since the risks of spillover and 
contagion are even greater.  They have also tended to be regional. [IMF May 1999] 
 
4.  A remarkable feature of the Asian crisis was the degree to which it spread 
from Thailand to other countries in the region, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Korea, very quickly, in the span of a few months.  There have 
been different explanations and proposals for how and why contagion spread so 
quickly in the region: macroeconomic similarities, trade links across countries, 
and cross-country financial links.  Careful examinations of macroeconomic 
indicators around the outbreak of the currency crises in the crisis-stricken 
nations have revealed the relative irrelevance of macroeconomic fundamentals 
with the eruption and contagion of the 1997 Asian crisis. (Radelet and Sachs 
1998, Chang and Velasco 1998)    
 
5. The swift and global-scale contagion of the recent crises seems to support 
financial links, rather than trade links, as the key channel of contagion.  The 
ultimate determination of the relative roles of the different channels of contagion 
in the case of the Asian crises is an empirical question.  Relevant issues to 
financial links may include the existence of a common lender for emerging 
economies, market imperfections with information asymmetries, and portfolio 
diversification and leverage adjustment for financial asset liquidity.  Krugman 
(2001) recently argued that the next generation of crises might affect not only 
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 6.  Jeon (2002a) provided evidence of financial linkages across countries as a 
channel of contagion for currency crises in the case of the 1997 Asian crisis using 
high-frequency data, focusing on the hardest hit countries in the region: Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea.  Stock markets in the region were found to play 
an important role in transmitting initial and local shocks beyond its country of 
origin to other emerging economies during the 1997 crisis.  Stock market linkages 
seem to have contributed importantly to the quick and wide-scale contagion of 
the ensuring exchange rate crisis across countries in the 1997 Asian crisis. 
 
7.  The first channel of spreading crises via stock market contagion will be the 
erosion of confidence by investors.  A decline in confidence caused by a currency 
crisis in the crisis-origin will result in falling stock prices with greater volatility.  
The spillover effects of falling stock prices to another country will further reduce 
the investors’ confidence in other countries and lead to a sharp decline in the 
value of its currency and currencies in those countries.  Stock market linkages 
provide an effective path for the spread of eroded confidence across countries.  
Speculative attack and self-fulfilling pessimism, which created the initial currency 
crisis in the origin country, are repeated in stock markets in other vulnerable 
emerging economies. 
 
8.  Stock market linkages also work as an indirect channel of contagion through 
the role of foreign investors.  When international investors are increasingly 
concerned about the prospect of crisis-stricken emerging economies, they try to 
withdraw from the emerging market economies and rebalance their portfolio 
positions.  Liquidity difficulties facing international investors as a result of 
currency crises also force the investors to liquidate their positions in other 
national markets, consequently spreading the crises. 
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9.  The recent turbulence in global financial markets has been increasing 
uncertainties and risk factors in the world economy.  In particular, emerging 
markets have been seriously affected.  A downfall at the New York Stock 
Exchange, caused by the collapse of the reliability of U.S. business due to the 
Enron scandal and the forged accounting by WorldCom and poor performances in 
corporate earnings by US firms, has also been triggering an across-the-board 
downfall in the share prices of Korea, Japan, and major ASEAN countries.  
Western institutional investors put Asian stocks up for sale, dropping stock 
prices further and withdrawing their funds from the Asian local markets.  
 
10.  Analysts said that the weakening share value in Asian stock markets has 
been due to foreign investors fleeing these markets on the hunch that a global 
crisis may result from the Argentine crisis of recent months.  The Argentine crisis 
has rattled global financial markets recently.  Furthermore, the recent downhill 
slide of the U.S. dollar, caused by the anxiety of the shaky U.S. economy 
stagnating during the post-September 11 period, has threatened the 
competitiveness of Asian exports of goods and services in the global market place.   
 
11.  The growth of East Asia has been dependent through many direct and 
indirect channels on an export machine for which U.S. demand has been the 
most important, final demand source.  The ultimate question is how to protect 
the East Asian economies from the reoccurrence of a similar financial crisis in the 
future in more uncertain and risky environments?   
 
12.  The main purpose of this paper is to provide a brief survey for the progress 
and prospects of regional financial arrangements/cooperation among the East 
Asian nations and present the summary of various conflicting points of 
discussion about the strategies on the establishment of an effective regional 
financial arrangement in the region.  I hope this brief critical survey will be useful 
to the participants of the International Finance Seminar as an effective source of 
their group discussions.  
 
 
II.  Do we need RFA/RFC in East Asia? 
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 1.  In retrospect, there have been various sources of dissatisfaction within the 
region in dealing with the 1997 crisis, which played a role in enhancing 
cooperation on the economic and financial aspects among Asian countries.  Those 
main sources of dissatisfaction include (Sussangkarn 2000): 
 
- unprepared financial liberalization which leads to an excessive influx of 
short-term foreign capital and a lack of risk hedging vehicles 
 
- volatile currency trading and speculative activities by Western investors 
and difficulty in establishing an appropriate exchange rate regime in light 
of such volatility, exchange rate misalignments, aggravated by unstable 
values of key currencies, during the pre- and post-crisis periods 
 
- lack of sufficient and prompt liquidity support from inside and outside the 
region in the early stage of the crisis and the lack of self-help mechanisms 
within the region 
 
- inappropriate, excessive, and uniform one-size-fits-all prescriptions 
imposed by the IMF as so-called IMF conditionality, ignoring country-
specific elements of the crisis situation and crisis management. 
 
2.  A collective approach is believed to serve better than an individualistic 
approach to manage the crises.  Some academics have argued that if East Asian 
nations had shown more solidarity in responding to the initial crisis in 1997, 
especially in defending the values of Asian currencies from the attack of 
speculative hedge funds, the severity of the crisis might have been reduced. 
 
3.  As mentioned earlier, the cross-country contagion in the 1997 Asian crises 
was observed to be swift, large-scale, and regional.  Currency crises based on 
financial linkages should not be matters of indifference to neighboring countries 
in the region.  Strong fundamentals in an economy do not guarantee the 
protection of the nation from exposure to speculative attacks and contagion.  
Outside investors in Asia often regard the region as one class of investment out of 
 5
either ignorance or a lack of transparent information for proper screening, which 
has created financial panic and bandwagon effects. 
 
4.  A new regionalism has been emerging in East Asia.  There has been 
recognition of the need to work much more closely together among themselves on 
financial and monetary matters for the interests of the region as a whole.  Several 
reasons for a rise of Asian regionalism have been identified (Ito 2002): a failure of 
initiating a new WTO round in Seattle, the experience of the Asian currency crisis, 
the emergence of the single market and currency in Europe, and the proliferation 
of FTAs in the rest of the world. 
Asians started to realize that they are ‘on the same boat’ so it makes sense to help 
each other to solve their own problems in the region.   
 
5.  The economies of East Asian nations have become increasingly interlinked.  
Financial cooperation within the region needs to be developed in line with trade 
and investment linkages in order to achieve the sustainable development and 
growth of the region as a whole. 
 
6.  The Asian regionalism has not been fully endorsed by Westerners.  For 
example, the proposal for the creation of a regional monetary fund in East Asia 
was strongly opposed by the U.S., the European countries, and the IMF for a 
number of reasons.  A more serious challenge was that East Asians were not 
ready to create and manage an effective regional monetary fund.  Another 
accusation was an overlapping role with the existing institutions, such as the 
WTO and IMF.  However, it would be possible that regional arrangements in Asia 




III.  Progress toward RFA/RFC 
 
1.  Having suffered from the havoc of the economic crises of 1997, many 
countries in East Asia started to realize the urgent need for financial and 
monetary cooperation in order to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar crisis in 
 6
the region in the future.  A regional framework has been taking shape as a 
consequence of the AMF proposal, the Manila Framework and the Chiang Mai 
Initiative.  [Note: There were several RFAs in the ASEAN and East Asian nations, 
but they were not very effective.] 
 
2.  In September 1997, Japan proposed an “Asian Monetary Fund” (AMF) to 
prevent the reoccurrence of another Asian financial crisis and to institutionalize 
financial cooperation among the countries in the region.  Strong objections from 
the U.S. and the IMF, among other reasons, almost killed the idea of AMF, 
leading to no further tangible progress toward establishing a regional monetary 
institution in East Asia, although there has been heated debate on how to prevent 
and manage further crises in the region.  The main argument was that it would 
overlap with the IMF and lead to an increased moral hazard problem. 
 
3.  In November 1997, a new framework for improved regional financial 
cooperation, called the ‘Manila Framework’ was announced in a meeting of 
finance ministers and central bankers from 14 Asia-Pacific countries in Manila to 
discuss further responses to the Asian financial crisis.  (Note: The 14 member 
nations are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
the U.S.)  The Manila Framework included the following four initiatives (The FTF 
Mtg. Document: FTF21-016, Singapore, June 2001): 
 
 Regional surveillance – As a mechanism to complement the global 
surveillance administered by the IMF, the Manila Framework conducts 
surveillance within the region.  Finance ministers and central bankers 
meet twice a year to discuss macroeconomic policies, foreign exchange 
policies, and appropriate financial systems in each of membership 
nations. 
 
 Technical assistance for strengthening the financial sector:  The Manila 
Framework recognized the importance of providing technical assistance 
for strengthening financial assistance to its member nations.  It also 
called on international financial institutions such as the IMF to support 
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  Request for strengthening the IMF’s ability to cope with financial crisis:  
The Manila Framework recognized that it is to the benefit of each 
member that the IMF strengthens its ability to deal with financial crises.  
The Manila Framework sought to achieve the effectiveness of the New 
Arrangement to Borrow, and a review of the access limit within the IMF 
financial program.  It further requested consideration of a mechanism 
for the provision of short-term loans to troubled economies. 
 
 Establishing cooperative financing support arrangements to stabilize 
Asian currencies:  The Manila Framework has agreed on the need to 
establish a cooperative financing support arrangements by which 
member economies in the region can provide other troublesome 
economies with complementary financing for IMF-supported programs.  
This is basically additional and complementary to financing support 
from the IMF in order to increase the international reserves of an 
economy in need of emergency liquidity support. 
 
4.  The Manila Framework was reinforced by the New Miyazawa Initiative, which 
prepared funds amounting to Yen 3 trillion (approx. US$30 billion) to be used for 
short-term liquidity support and long-term bilateral assistance to troublesome 
member nations.  The initiative also augmented the significance of providing a 
forum for periodic surveillance among regional members. 
  
5.  The search for regional financial arrangements gained momentum in May 
2000, when the ASEAN + 3 finance ministers agreed to expand the existing 
network of swap arrangements by including all ASEAN countries, China, Japan, 
and Korea, designed to better withstand future financial crises by helping central 
banks of other countries in the region.  [Note: “The Initiative involves an expanded 
ASEAN Swap Arrangement that would include all ASEAN countries, and a 
network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN 
countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.” The Joint Ministerial 
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Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting, May 6, 2000, Chiang Mai, 
Thailand.] 
 
6.  The plan, called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), is considered as a major step 
toward strengthening financial cooperation among the East Asian countries.  The 
rationale of the CMI was to strengthen the self-help and support mechanisms in 
East Asia by establishing a regional financing arrangement to supplement 
existing international facilities. 
 
7.  Subsequently, the ASEAN nations agreed, at the ASEAN+3 summit conference 
held in Singapore in November 2000, to expand the size of the multilateral 
currency swap facility from $200 million to $1 billion  Three bilateral currency 
swap agreements between Korea and Japan ($7 billion, Korean won and 
Japanese yen based), Malaysia and Japan, and Thailand and Japan, a total of $6 
billion, were also signed in May 2001.  Financial assistance under the bilateral 
swap agreement would be made when IMF facilities are to be activated in the near 
future.  [Note: The government-to-government currency swap deal provides that 
one country may borrow funds from the other country in the contract and has the 
effect of building up a country’s foreign exchange reserve.] 
 
8.  In November 2001, Korea reached an agreement with China and Thailand to 
swap ($ based) $ 2 billion, and $1 billion, respectively, in case of an emergency.  
The currency swap deals were expected to lessen the impact of rapid fluctuations 
in the value of the U.S. dollar, interest rates, and stock prices in the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. 
 
9.  Many other areas of RFA among the East Asian nations have been identified 
and discussed, despite little tangible progress, including: the ASEAN surveillance 
process, capital flow monitoring, capital market development, and a preliminary 
discussion of the possibility of a monetary union. 
 
 
IV. Prospects for RFA/RFC: Several options 
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1.  The ultimate objective for establishing RFA/RFC in East Asia should be to 
prevent the reoccurrence of another economics crisis in the region, which is being 
prepared collectively at the regional level.  A specific agenda for reform will 
include establishing an early warning system, strengthening regional surveillance, 
establishing a new, quick financing facilities as a complement to the IMF facility, 
strengthening financial market supervision and regulation, and reshaping the G-
7 led international financial architecture reform efforts by including capital 
controls and regulations of speculative hedge funds.   
  
Option 1: An Asian lender of last resort? 
 
2.  The IMF has often been described as an international lender of last resort 
(LLR).  Member countries turn to the Fund when no one else will lend to them on 
affordable terms.  Do the East Asian nations need their own LLR?  An LLR is an 
institution that is willing and able to supply unlimited amounts of short-term 
credit to financial institutions when they are threatened by a creditor panic, 
which would do serious damage to the real economy.  The LLR should lend freely 
to illiquid banks but not to insolvent banks, which require prudential supervision 
and screening ability.  The Asian LLR will serve as the ultimate bulwark against 
creditor panic, because no other institution can take on that task. 
 
3.  Some critics insist that the Asian countries should not have been asked to 
tighten their fiscal and monetary policies; they were the victims of creditor panic, 
not misguided domestic policies. (Kenen 2001)  The critics of conditionality were 
revived in 2000 by the Meltzer Report, commissioned by the U.S. Congress, which 
described conditionality as being both intrusive and ineffective.  Asians must 
know themselves better than outsiders.  It would be harsh or unjust to ask crisis-
stricken countries to pursue far-reaching structural reforms in the midst of a 
crisis.  It inspired the attempt to promote regional financial/monetary cooperation 
in Asia. 
 
4.  The original idea of a self-help RFA, known as the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
was proposed by Japan in August 1997.  The resources that could be mobilized 
from Asian countries could be pooled together and used as a regional LLR.  The 
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U.S. and European countries, along with the IMF, squashed the Japanese 
attempt to establish the AMF.  The main accusations were the AMF’s functional 
overlap with existing institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, and a serious 
moral hazard problem caused by the so-called soft conditionality and lack of 
discipline among peer group nations. 
 
5.  The advocates of the AMF stress the need for a regional lender of last resort 
because global emergency resources for East Asia, including the IMF and the 
World Bank, are insufficient, considering the size of the East Asian economies in 
the face of volatile capital flows in and out of the region.  Furthermore, a regional 
monetary organization is nothing new: the Arab Monetary Fund (1976) and the 
Latin American Reserve Fund (1991). 
 
6.  Other cases for an Asian LLR include: augmented sources of short-term 
liquidity to member nations in need of short-term assistance (the first line of 
defense or the second line of defense), cut the probability of financial contagion in 
the region, increasingly linked regional economies, maintaining exchange rate 
stability with less volatility, more accurate acquaintance with member countries’ 
socioeconomic-political-cultural background in the region, and more reliable and 
updated peer review by insiders than by outsiders.  
 
7.  Several variants of the AMF proposal have been presented in an attempt to 
address the concerns mentioned above.  For example, the Asian Policy Forum 
(APF) 2000 proposed an RFA that would provide a LLR facility together with the 
implementation of an effective surveillance system over Asian economies and 
complement the activities of the IMF through close collaboration with each other. 
 
Option 2:  Pulling resources of international reserve assets 
 
8.  A weaker form of RFA/RFC would be pooling international reserve assets and 
sharing the pooling resources among member nations in the region.  An example 
of the weak form of resource pooling would be the bilateral/ multilateral currency 
swap agreement under the Chiang Mai Initiative.   
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9.  Other form would be a common decentralized reserve pooling mechanism, in 
which each member nation contributes a specified share of its international 
reserve assets to a common pool.  Each country would then be eligible to draw on 
the pool for an amount up to a predetermined multiple of the amount deposited. 
(KRP 2002) 
 
10.  The combined international reserves held by ASEAN+3 nations amount to 
US$ 781 billion as of August 2000, of which Japan made up 43 percent, followed 
by China with 20 percent, Korea with 11 percent, and the remaining 26 percent 
from 10 ASEAN member nations.  The challenge would be to decide what 
percentage of international reserves held by each member nations is to be 
contributed to the total regional pool, how the ceiling of facilities is to be 
determined, and in what form of contingent credits these resources are to be 
made available. (Tan and Chen 2001) 
 
11.  Since the resource pooling needs decisions on the disbursement of the funds 
as short-term liquidity assistance, based on accurate assessments of each 
member nation’s situation, smooth and active flows of information among 
member nations in the region is expected. 
 
12.  A participating nation in the resource pooling can economize on their own 
reserve accumulation by gaining access to the total regional pool of liquid funds, 
and, as a member of the group, each country gains some influence over the 
policies of other members. 
 
13.  For example, Korea’s foreign currency reserve which decreased to USD 3 
billion during the financial crisis of 1997, increased considerably to more than 
US$112 billion, and Korea became the country which has the 4th largest amount 
of international reserves in the world, after Japan, China and Taiwan.  As the 
foreign currency reserve of Korea sharply increased since the 1997 crisis, there 
are controversies over whether Korea which is thirteenth in economic size, should 
retain the large foreign currency.  
14.  According to a report on proper retaining exchange of emerging nations by 
the IMF in September 2001, sufficient foreign currency reserves will be a 
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breakwater of the foreign exchange risk, but excessive reserves are the 
squandering of the nation’s resources. Accordingly, it is somewhat undesirable 
that some countries experienced in the financial crisis have retained larger 
amounts of reserves than needed.  
[Note: The IMF advises emerging countries to retain the foreign exchange over 
adding the size of estimated withdrawal of residents to the short-term foreign loan, 
which must be repaid within one year.  It means that the proper foreign currency 
reserves of Korea is around US$ 63.2 billion ~ US$ 70.5 billion.  However, Park 
Seung, the governor of the Bank of Korea announced, “In a future financial crisis, 
the proper level of maintaining the nation’s credit would be around US$ 90 
billion.’’ 
15.  Objections on this option include: insufficient pool of reserve stock, 
likelihood of spreading contagion due to reserve pooling itself, lack of commitment 
especially by strong-currency countries and existence of opt-out clauses, and the 
probable weak conditionality imposed on the disbursement out of a pooled stock 
of reserves. (ADB, May 2002) 
 
Option 3:  Regional Surveillance Institute in East Asia? 
 
16.  The most important precondition for successful RFA/RFC in the region is the 
institutionalization of a monitoring and surveillance mechanism.  Surveillance 
means monitoring the status and prospects of economic conditions by a 
multinational forum or an international body.  Effective surveillance should 
include the monitoring of economic conditions, international capital flows in and 
out of countries in the region, and potential vulnerabilities in the member 
countries. (Ito 2001) 
 
17. Approval of financial assistance by an Asian LLR or pooled resources 
requires monitoring and surveillance of the macroeconomic conditions of each of 
the member nations and their capital flows.  The development of a regional early 
warning system (EWS) will be possible only when an effective monitoring and 
surveillance system is launched. 
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18.  For the enhancement of the current regional surveillance process within the 
ASEAN+3 framework in the form of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), an 
independent Regional Surveillance Unit has been proposed. (KRP 2002)  The Unit 
or Institute will be an independent source of information on the state of regional 
economies and analysis of regional economic developments, supplementing those 
of international financial institutions. 
 
19.  An effective regional surveillance system is expected to contribute to crisis 
prevention by providing accurate and updated information on the individual and 
regional economies and capital movements, detecting early signs of 
economic/financial vulnerabilities, and enabling an expedited injection of short-




V.  Challenges and obstacles to RFA/RFC: Long-run issues 
 
1.  Several obstacles that need to be overcome for successful regional financial 
cooperation among the East Asian nations include the diversity and heterogeneity 
of the countries’ economic characteristics, a wide spectrum in terms of economic 
development and lack of economic convergence in the region, and the lack of 
political will and commitment to regional cooperation and integration. (KRP 2002)   
 
2.  The ongoing CMI framework needs to elaborate on various important, practical 
questions: Under what terms will financing be extended on a regional basis?  Is it 
likely to stabilize or destabilize international capital flows?  What will the CMI 
relationship be to the IMF and other official financial institutions?  Could they 
provide the basis for broader integration of the East Asian region? (Henning 2002)   
 
3.  Another important but practical question is who will and is able to lead 
harmonious efforts toward establishing an effective and solid RFA/RFC in the 




4.  A long-term strategy and vision will lead the East Asian nations to an 
intensive form of financial and monetary integration, which may create an Asian 
monetary union and a single Asian currency.  (Note: KRP (June 2002) sets the 
year 2030 as the target year for launching an Asian single currency and the 
establishment of an Asian economic and monetary union.) 
 
5.  This critical survey can derive a list of viable and practical strategies for 
establishing an effective RFA/RFC scheme in the East Asian region in order to 
prevent the reoccurrence of a financial/economic crisis and large-scale contagion 
in the region in the future.  We put them to the discussion by International 
Finance Seminar participants:  
 
 to enhance the “political will” of implementation and commitment to the 
development of a self-help support mechanism beyond the CMI 
framework in the East Asian region, 
 
 to create an environment of supports from the IMF, ASEM and G-7 
nations by, first, pushing a regional RFA/RFC scheme, such as the CMI 
in progress, to be structured to complement, not contradict to, the IMF 
and other international institutions, and, second, eliminating moral 
hazard concerns by establishing a set of clear operational guidance and 
principles in extending financial facilities to member nations.  A strategic 
alliance with ASEM will be a good option to mitigate oppositions from 
outside of East Asia. 
 
 To convince Westerners that first, a regional fund could monitor and 
respond to crises in the region more appropriately and swiftly, and 
second, the East Asians have the commitment, ability and know-how to 
establish and run an independent but supplementary RFA/RFC in East 
Asia by developing an effective regional surveillance system, 
 
 To present a clear vision based on a gradual and progressive approach to 
expanding the CMI of the ASEAN+3 toward the AMF, or alike, as an Asian 
LLR, and the eventual establishment of the AMU in the future, 
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  And to seek for stable and productive sources of foreign capital with long-
term maturity, including FDI and bond-market financing. (Jeon and Ahn 
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